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Abstract
Drawing on the fields of psychoanalysis and psychosocial studies, this article investigates the
states of mind of both the parties in conflict and the mediators. It proposes that, when framed
as a relational intersubjective encounter, mediation can have transformative potentials beyond
the political goals. The article aims to rebalance the current rationalistic orientation in
mediation and argues that valuing and engaging with the affective register in mediation
processes and the states of mind of the mediation actors can better equip mediators to
understand and deal with the unpredictability, instability, and blockages in mediation
processes.
The article discusses the relevance for mediation of selected clinical and psychological
concepts and proposes them as potential tools for mediators. It looks at the role of trauma,
mentalization, shame, and group identity when considering the state of mind of parties in
conflict and proposes countertransference, emotional attunement, and empathic mutual
positioning as facilitative skills when reflecting on the role of the mediator. It discusses the
need for mediators to reflect on their own story and investment in the process and urges
practitioners to consider the toxic impact of mediation on the mediator’s well-being. The article
concludes with recommendation for training and practice.
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This article stems from the homonymous ongoing research project States of Mind in Conflict,
which explores the role of psychology in mediation processes.1 As the title suggests, the project
investigates the states of mind of the actors involved in mediation, primarily the parties in
conflict but also the mind of the mediators directly involved in the process. The project, which
is wider in scope than this article, focuses on the broader field of the psychology of mediation.
The main thrust of this article is to ask how else we can understand mediation encounters
beyond their obvious political remits and to argue that states of mind of all participants, which
are traditionally unacknowledged and ignored, should be considered an important and
unavoidable aspect of the mediation process. I argue that failure to value and engage with states
of mind will increase the unpredictability and intrinsic instability of the process.
The United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation defines mediation as a “process
whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, manage or
resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable agreements. The premise of
mediation is that, in the right environment, conflict parties can improve their relationships and
move towards cooperation.” 2 This definition highlights the “means to an end” function of
mediation. For our purposes, however, the key word in the definition is “relationship,” which
is the focus of this article and its approach to mediation as a “relational intersubjective
encounter.”
Bohleber’s reflections on the psychoanalytic encounter capture why intersubjectivity is
of great relevance for mediation processes too. Bohleber argues that “it is not sufficient, as in
a two-person psychology, to describe two players having an effect on each other; rather, the
interaction itself, which cannot be disaggregated into individual proportions for each of the
interaction partners, must be conceptualized. An encounter is always more than the impact it
has on those doing the encountering.” 3 Thus, “intersubjectivity takes the nature of an event,
giving rise to something new that transcends the contributions of the two actors.” 4 This idea is
of huge relevance for mediation because it helps us conceptualize the mediation encounter as
having powerful transformative and far-reaching potentials beyond the ones already on the
table and agreed on, such as ceasefire and peace agreement.
Given the considerable pressures exercised on the involved actors and intrinsic to the
process of mediation—from constituencies, donors, mandates, allies, saboteurs, and so on—
and the rationalist underpinnings of mediation theory, it is not surprising that a predominantly
instrumental focus has so far dominated any approach to mediation. The intersubjective
framing proposed here is not intended to replace the primacy of desired goals and outcomes or
to ignore existing pressures and interests. It is a given that material conditions exist and cannot
be “psychologized away”—power imbalances and geopolitical interests and constraints as well
as the hard distributive bargaining aspects of mediation cannot be properly addressed in this
article but are nevertheless considered the crucial backdrop to it. Instead, the proposed
reframing aims to rebalance the orientation in mediation processes by offering a holistic
appreciation of the processes and a more complex understanding of all actors involved. The
aim is to contribute to the success and sustainability of peace mediation processes by providing
mediators with new understandings and skills.
Before getting into the substantive content of the article, it is important to clarify its
theoretical, epistemological, and strategic orientation. The epistemological framing of both the
project and article is psychosocial, which also informs the approach to emotions and affect.
The new and emerging field of psychosocial studies is predicated on the indissoluble
interrelation of “internal” (psychic processes, unconscious, preconscious/prereflective factors,
affects and emotions) and “external” (sociocultural, historical, and political) dynamics that
shape who we are and how we relate to ourselves and others.5
Thus, the psychosocial subject “is both a centre of agency and action (a language-user, for
example) and the subject of (or subjected to) forces operating elsewhere—whether that be the
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‘crown,’ the state, gender, ‘race’ and class, or the unconscious. The important point is that the
subject is not a pre-given entity, or something to be found through searching; it is rather a site,
in which there are criss-crossing lines of forces, and out of which that precious feature of
human existence, subjectivity, emerges” (italics added).6
The “inside” in people’s interior dynamics can never be fully or properly understood
without the “outside” and vice-versa. This framing has important implications for
understanding how human beings operate and the interactions between people and,
consequently, for understanding mediation processes. The application of a psychosocial frame
bypasses traditional dichotomies, for example, the sociocultural and psychological, to propose
a new field that is “in-between” and enables new formulations and vistas. This psychosocial
“in-between” is both inter-subjective—between individuals and groups, parties in conflict,
parties in the mediation, including mediators—and intra-subjective, which refers to the
fluctuations, tensions, and conflict ordinarily happening in people’s minds but also to the
specific states of mind of traumatized parties. Through a psychosocial theoretical framework,
it is possible to articulate how the structural informs and shapes the “personal” and vice-versa;
for example, how unresolved or unacknowledged trauma can lead to a resurgence of conflict.
This psychosocial formulation is transformative because it complexifies the understanding of
the conflicting parties and how their minds operate. It breaks down disciplinary barriers and is
able to attend to both social and group dimensions and the individual’s psychic and emotional
damage and how it gets transmitted across generations 7 by contextualizing the parties’
responses and behaviors within their sociopolitical-cultural histories. This psychosocial
framing translates into an appreciation that what is brought to mediation are minds at war with
each other and with themselves and that minds are not monolithic and fixed but conflicted,
fluid, and fragmented, and representing different internal and external constituencies.
This psychosocial “in-between” orientation is the thread running through this article and
acts as a constant invitation to move away from the individualized understanding of people
found in more traditional approaches to psychology, to always approach each topic of
consideration—whether it is trauma, specific emotions, or unconscious dynamics—not in
isolation but in their interplay and their impact on the relational field. This psychosocial lens
also informs my take on the much-debated understanding of emotions and affects.
According to Feldman Barrett, there is widespread confusion about the difference between
“affect” and “emotion”; many scientists use the word “affect” when they mean emotion and
“emotion” when they mean affect. 8 Feldman Barrett defines “affect” as one’s basic sense of
feeling, ranging from unpleasant to pleasant (valence) and from agitated to calm (arousal),
while emotion is a much more complex mental construction.
For mainstream psychologists, neuroscientists, and affective scientists, “affects” are a
combination of emotional states and the distinctive perturbations they cause in the body and
mind. In social sciences, the “turn to affect”9 has also focused on embodiment “to attempt to
understand how people are moved, and what attracts them, to an emphasis on repetitions, pains
and pleasures, feelings and memories.”10
Following Wetherell, I refer to affects as embodied meaning-making and affective
practice with a focus “on the emotional as it appears in social life.” This approach “finds
shifting, flexible and often over-determined figurations rather than simple lines of causation,
character types and neat emotional categories.”11 Thus, in reflecting on the role of emotions in
mediation processes, I pay attention to the role of discrete emotions, such as shame or hatred,
but I also engage with the affective eruptions of unprocessed contents that constantly disrupt
and flood the mind with irrationality and “excess.” Paraphrasing Clough and Halley, I am
interested in how social formations “grab” people because “personal history, subjectivity and
affective practice develop in social relations . . . [and] the intimate connection between the
personal and the social is present in all lived affective trajectories.”12
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A psychosocial perspective also involves an engagement with interiority and psychic life,
the nature of the self, or why issues of self and identity arise in negotiation and mediation.
Developmental psychoanalytic theory does address these questions, but Bader, for example,
laments how psychodynamic theory is rarely discussed in the conflict resolution literature. The
result is that peacemaking, one of the most profound human activities, is often discussed in a
way that does not fully consider its inner dimensions.13
This article attempts to integrate psychoanalytic theory into the discussion of mediation
but mindful of the epistemological and ethical pitfalls of bringing together such different
disciplines and practices. In applying psychoanalytic concepts and ideas to mediation, I am not
suggesting exact parallels or analogies. Instead, I am proposing that mediation, as an
intersubjective relational encounter, involves psychological processes whose understanding
would be enriched by the application of particular psychoanalytic insights.
This point is particularly important in consideration that, above all, the strategic aim for
this article is to be practice oriented. It never loses sight of how, to be useful to the practice of
mediation, conceptualizations cannot stay abstract or purely theoretical but must open up new
vistas and increase understanding and effectiveness. To this end, the theories and concepts
considered here are discussed dialogically as offerings that can potentially translate into useful
tools for mediation practitioners.
The article’s thrust, therefore, is to create a space in which it might be possible to view
mediation processes as something different from an exclusively strategic and instrumental
dance of push and pull to achieve a particular aim. However precious the goal of ceasefire, for
example, or peace negotiations might be, a psychological approach reconnects us to the basic
reality that any mediation is always and primarily a human encounter.
This point has been made compellingly by Lyse Ducet, BBC chief international
correspondent. Describing processes of mediation in the June 22, 2020, podcast The Mediator’s
Studio, she argues that mediation is about getting inside the parties’ minds, understanding the
hurt, and listening to the stories, narratives, and histories lived in the present to find a middle
ground both parties can live in.
Because people and their human stories form an integral part, much of what happens in
mediation processes is talking and listening, through which both sides come closer to each
other. We cannot neglect the hard distributive bargaining part of mediation, particularly in
high-level international mediation Yet, understanding the minds of all actors—including the
mediators’—is the first necessary step toward engaging with the unspoken and hidden stories
that hide behind claims, positions, posturing, and sudden and inexplicable collapses of the
process.
I begin with a brief review of the field and an introduction to key psychoanalytic
formulations. I then discuss the minds of the parties in conflict and the mind of the mediator
and its function, and conclude with a section on recommendations for practice and training.

The Conversation So Far
Various attempts have been made to apply psychological tools and theories to the field of
mediation with particular attention been paid to the role of emotions in mediation processes.
Theories of mediation have evolved from the field of international relations (IR), which has
taken a strong negative stance toward emotions. Nathan and Ash question the premises of this
stance, which they link to IR’s reliance on an allegedly dispassionate rational actor model
(RAM).14 This model assumes that the conflict parties’ decisions are based on a rational costbenefit assessment of their options, ignoring the emotions of the parties as a relevant variable.
Nathan and Ash consider these premises “far-fetched.” They argue that “it is implausible that
conflict parties, locked in an epic, violent and traumatic struggle to prevail over a hated enemy
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and avoid being defeated, make decisions on mediation, negotiated settlements and long-term
existence in a dispassionate way.” They suggest that a more realistic model of party decisionmaking with respect to mediation would be holistic, incorporating the parties’ “visceral
emotions of hatred, anger, fear and suspicion.” 15 As things stand, when emotions are
considered, as in the international mediation literature, they are treated superficially and not
theorized adequately.
Crawford agrees that, within IR, emotions are generally disavowed because of widely held
assumptions that they are primitive and biological. 16 As such, they are perceived to be a
hindrance or, at best, a human malfunction that one has to tolerate. Passions are often treated
as fleeting, private, reactive, and not amenable to systematic analysis and therefore an obstacle
in the path of the alleged rational progress of mediation. Crawford believes that this prejudice
can be traced to the epistemological bases of Western philosophy and social sciences that
assume and reify dichotomies and discontinuities such as mind/body, brain/mind,
thinking/feeling, and rational/irrational. In line with this dichotomized view of human nature,
IR assumes a dichotomy between individual agency and group behavior.
Crawford and Nathan and Ash argue that emotions help structure the social world and that
emotions and cognition do not exist in dichotomy or discontinuity. Crawford argues that
individual and group agencies share many features and that emotions are an essential element
of world politics conceived as a system of reflexive and complex adaptive systems. 17
A good example of the “rationalist” trend that Crawford is critical of is the influential
“Getting to yes” by Fisher and Uri, which naively advocates that the key to good negotiation
is parking, denying, or siphoning-off emotional responses in order to engage more rationally
and therefore effectively. 18 The innovation in this work is its attempt to push past the
“positional bargaining” model of haggling, where one party is usually left feeling as though
they have lost out. Fisher and Uri do acknowledge that emotions such as fear and anger often
structure negotiations, but rather than properly engaging this emotional/affective register, they
pursue a more concrete, rationalist model that proposes to separate people from problems,
focus on interests not fixed positions (i.e. what are the underling motives/interests not the
headline positions), invent “options for mutual gain,” and insist on using “objective” criteria.
In the more recent Beyond Reason, by Fisher and Shapiro, the aim shifts to engaging and using
emotions effectively, with five strategies proposed for gaining a handle on emotions (of self
and other) in negotiations, many of which seem to rest on the principle of introducing mutual
recognition, a concept I return to and examine from a psychoanalytic perspective.19
An alternative approach to emotions in mediation comes from the field of neuroscience
and the exploration of the relationship between emotion and cognition. Through studying
people with right-hemisphere brain damage, the part of the brain where emotions and emotional
regulation activity appears to take place, Damasio observed that these people experience
significant difficulties with decision making. 20 He concludes that they encounter this difficulty
because decision making is not a simple question of the rational weighing of pros and cons; it
involves emotions, which act as guideposts to tell people what it is they (don’t) want. The role
played by emotion regulation in cognition and behavior has been long recognized by
psychoanalysis and psychiatry as a key function of mentalization and reflective capacities.
This interdisciplinary literature suggests the need for a shift in focus from the unrealistic
wish for sanitizing mediation processes of emotions to facilitating their regulation. This shift
is vital when considering how trauma severely damages emotional regulation and taking into
account that the parties involved in mediation are likely to have been traumatized. I return to
the impact of trauma on people’s capacity for mentalization later in this article.
Complimenting Damasio’s neuroscientific work on the relationship between affect and
cognition, Forgas, like Crawford, argues that affect and cognition are indissoluble because they
are “integrally linked within an associative network of cognitive representations.”21
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In keeping with this finding, research points to a bi-directional link between our affect and
cognition; affect influences attention, memory, thinking, association, and judgment. Equally,
cognitive processes are integral to elicitation of affective states, as people’s appraisal and
analysis of situational information activate appropriate emotional responses. 22 This
neuroscientific evidence supports the interconnectedness of emotions and cognition that
underpins the model of states of mind I discuss here. In turn, the associative network of
cognitive representations filters cognition and affect, highlighting the importance of engaging
with and understanding the cognitive representations of self and other that are operative in the
minds of the parties engaged in mediation.
As Forgas argues, affects and emotions are not simply a symptom of events that happen
in the world; they actively shape those events in the first place: “In other words, affect is not
an incidental, but an inseparable, part of how we see and represent the world around us; how
we select, store, and retrieve information; and how we use stored knowledge structures in the
performance of cognitive tasks.”23
Within political psychology, Kelman has proposed the influential approach of “interactive
problem solving,” which frames the conflict as a “shared problem—essentially a problem in
the relationship,” the solution to which relies on reciprocal acknowledgment and activities. 24
Though distinct from the more psychoanalytic idea of “the third,” explored later, and the
intersubjective field, Kelman’s framing of conflict as a problem in the relationship firmly
places mediation processes in the relational field “in-between” parties.
Others have engaged more directly with the mediator’s or mediators’ emotional state. For
example, Brooks and Schweitzer, working from a pragmatic business perspective, point out
that negotiations, loosely defined, trigger anxiety and that anxiety has a negative impact on
negotiator performance.25 Research carried out by Leary and colleagues supports this claim
and provides compelling evidence that mediators experience anxiety. 26 They applied the
Zaltman’s “ZMET model” to ask experienced negotiators to produce collages about the
negotiation process.27 The artwork, which includes images of “alligators and other predators
lying in wait,” illustrates the amount of anxiety circulating in mediation processes and
experienced by the mediators themselves. The authors postulate three reasons the process of
negotiation/mediation is inherently stressful: (1) the experience of lack of control and reliance
on other people’s behavior cannot be fully anticipated or accounted for in advance and is likely
to evoke feelings of vulnerability; (2) the unpredictability and liveness of negotiations create
multiple unknowns; and (3) an absence of feedback, by which the authors seem to mean not
knowing what the other person or persons are thinking, tends to be compounded in situations
where there is a lack of trust and persecutory fantasies are projected onto the opposing
negotiators. The authors’ observation that lack of feedback generated a lack of self-belief and
faith in the competence of negotiators seems pertinent to mediation. How confident do
mediators really feel? They intervene in very complex situations with high degrees of failure
and under tremendous pressure. How qualified do they feel to be in the position they are in?
How do they manage the inevitable doubts and emotional impact of setbacks? How do they
deal emotionally with the tremendous pressure to stop hostilities to prevent human casualties?
How can we understand the lack of discussion of what appears as a reinforced culture of denial
of vulnerability? Several mediators and mediator-support actors we interviewed referred to
these questions as the best kept secret and related it to mediation, particularly high-level
mediation, being predominantly a male profession, underpinned by gender-related taboos, such
as showing vulnerability. A culture like this of denial, emotional repression, and rationalization
is likely to provoke unhealthy coping mechanisms in the mediator because these mechanisms
seem to be the only ones available.
More recently, scholars have steered away from attempts to cleanse mediation of emotion
and have focused instead on the impact of emotions on the process of mediation. For example,
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Rifkind and Yawanarajah point out that the context in which parties in conflict enter
negotiations generates mutual suspicion and negative emotions that are defined by a rigid state
of mind, which is rarely in the best interests of any party. 28 To bypass this psychological
blockage, the authors advocate the creation of a safe space, where conflict parties can explore
their feelings, internal narratives, and personal motives and understand that these intense
emotions may not be serving their “best interest.” The aim is to work with the parties to help
them abandon their rigid states of mind and emotional attachments to their positions, modify
their expectations, and achieve an improved state of “psychological readiness” that allows them
to be in a better state of mind to participate around the peace table. A further challenge, as
pointed out by some of our interviewees, is determining how to sustain such “readiness” when
the parties’ constituencies have not made the same transition.
I take these points further by suggesting that a deeper engagement with the psychology of
mediation can turn the mediation itself into a safe or safer space not just for the parties in
conflict but for mediators too.

The Unconscious Mind in the Intersubjective Field of Mediation
To fully appreciate the meaning and potential of intersubjectivity for mediation processes, we
need to identify some key concepts on which the dynamics of intersubjectivity are predicated.
In psychoanalysis, the unconscious mind is understood as being descriptively unconscious—
that is, as operating outside of consciousness and therefore not easily accessible through
rational cognitive processes—and as the system Unconscious, which operates as a psychic
structure—that is, following specific mechanisms and processes. The Conscious mind follows
secondary processes—that is, events follow their temporal structure, past and present are
clearly demarcated, and a sense of time exists that, for example, enables tolerance of frustration
through the knowledge that gratification will come if we wait. In contrast, the Unconscious
mind, understood as psychic structure, operates according to primary processes in which only
the present exists, frustration is intolerable, and events in the past can be experienced as if they
were happening now. The significance of the mind’s different modes of functioning will
become clear when we discuss the effects of trauma on the mind and the importance of affect
regulation for mentalization in mediation.
The Conscious and Unconscious parts of the minds coexist in a dynamic but conflictual
relationship. We learn through development to contain and censor our infantile impulses and
regulate our emotions in order to live with others. Under ordinary circumstances, regulation of
our emotions comes relatively easily, but under conditions of conflict it becomes harder. The
important point here is that we should always consider both external reality and psychic reality
and how the dynamic and conflictual interplay between the two can manifest as sudden and
unexpected affective eruptions or blockages. Awareness of this conflictual interplay in the
parties’ minds is important for mediation because what appears to be irrational resistance to
the process might make perfect sense intrapsychically. Though mediators are not therapists,
such awareness could give them tools to manage and maneuver around blockages and
impasses. The branch of psychology that has most robustly studied and theorized relationality
in the intersubjective field is psychoanalysis, in particular the relational school of
psychoanalysis.29
Bohleber compellingly states that “another person is needed to experience our own self”
and that “developmental research has shown how, from the outset, the childlike self emerges
from reciprocal regulation and recognition processes in the primary relationship.”30 Thus, a
psychoanalytic formulation of intersubjectivity goes beyond a psychological appreciation of
individuals’ emotions in isolated silos and their impact on the mediation process. As Stolorow
and colleagues point out, “intersubjective systems theory seeks to comprehend psychological
phenomena not as products of isolated intrapsychic mechanisms, but as forming at the interface
7
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of reciprocally interacting worlds of experience.” Furthermore, they argue, in a claim that is
highly relevant for mediation, the “intersubjective field” is the “contextual precondition for
having any experience at all.”31
Developmentally speaking, the subject experiences recurring patterns of intersubjective
transaction, which give rise to principles (thematic patterns, meaning structures) that
unconsciously organize subsequent emotional and relational experiences—that is, emotional
templates are developed and called on in future scenarios. Such organizing principles are
unconscious, in the sense of being prereflective, thus ordinarily not entering the domain of
reflective self-awareness. These intersubjectively derived, prereflective organizing principles
are the basic building blocks of personality development, and their totality constitutes a
person’s character.
In protracted and intractable conflict, the emotional templates are generated in the context
of conflicts persisting over generations, through which perceptions of self and the other have
become rigid and polarized and war has become normalized because, often and tragically, for
some youth that is all they have known in their lives. By applying these psychoanalytic
formulations to the encounter between parties in conflict, mediation can be framed as a
dialogical method for bringing this prereflective organizing activity into reflective selfawareness. Cultivating reflexivity in the mediator’s mind as a source of information on the
participants’ states of mind can aid the mediation process.
The co-created intersubjective field in mediation is always contextual, idiosyncratic, and
case specific but, at the same time, predictably consistent. For example, the participants are
likely to be hurt, angry, and traumatized. Thus, the universal factors are, on one hand, that the
minds of the parties in conflict are likely to be rigid, polarized, and governed by largely
unconscious organizing templates, as described earlier, while, on the other hand, they will have
the innate capacity for empathy and relationality, however much these capacities have been
undermined by prolonged hatred and dehumanization of the enemy.
The necessity to be attentive to both the specific and the universal components of each
mediation process calls for a psychosocial framing of mediation as an intersubjective encounter
that can activate and mobilize participants’ universal potentials for empathy while attending to
the psychosocial specificity of the encounter. In this regard, psychology and psychoanalysis
provide vital information on the underlying psychological mechanisms and universal human
predispositions that the mediators could harness to do their work and achieve their aims more
effectively.
The discovery of the mirror neurons as well as research into early imitation, which sets in
immediately after birth, have boosted the opinion that intersubjectivity is an innate capability 32
and is facilitated by mentalization, which, in turn, is a component of a more general
psychological capacity called reflective functioning. Mentalization is the capacity to
distinguish and understand mental states in oneself and others. 33 Reflective functioning is
important during interpersonal conflict and, consequently, for mediation because “conflict—
or, rather, its adaptive resolution—prototypically calls for the perception of the self and of the
other in relation to the self,”34 “requiring individuals to reconcile their own legitimate claims
with concern for the other.”35
My key argument is that mediation has the potential to mobilize that innate capability for
intersubjectivity and to move the parties in conflict away from their rigid and polarized position
toward a new experience of encountering the other, and themselves, anew. In turn, the
internalization of the mediator modeling empathic mutual positioning (discussed later) has the
potential to support and foster increased mentalization. Through this formulation, we can
appreciate the dynamic interaction between specific characteristics of mediation. On one hand,
mediation is always situated, sociohistorically contextual, and idiosyncratically co-constructed
by the participating parties. On the other hand, mediation is predicated on commonalities across
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different sociocultural context—for example, that conflicted parties are likely to be hateful,
angry, and traumatized—and has the potential for mobilizing universal human potential for
empathy, mentalization, and relationality.
“The Third”—Analytic and Moral
This transformative potential of approaching mediation as a relational intersubjective
encounter is at the heart of Benjamin’s formulation of the “moral third”36 and her definition of
intersubjectivity as a relationship determined by mutual recognition.37 “Seeking recognition is
a human need but it can be met only if we first and concurrently recognize the other, who has
to recognize us, as the recognition we receive through him [sic] will otherwise not be fully
valid or will even be worthless.”38 Her solution is “the third,” an intersubjective mental space
co-created by both subjects, which hinges on the ability to surrender, that is, allow oneself a
certain letting-go of the self, adopt the view of the other, and perceive things from his or her
perspective.
On similar lines but referring exclusively to the analytic encounter, Ogden calls the
product of the unconscious interplay between analyst and patient the “analytic third,” a third
subjectivity, which is an independent dynamic unit of the intersubjective event. Like the
intersubjective field in mediation, “the third” is not within the control of any one party,
including the mediator.39 For many patients it can be a new experience of a healthy, generative
form of object relatedness.
Given the prevalence of insecure forms of attachment and relatedness for parties in
conflict, mediation also can offer the potential of a new, generative encounter—even before
one gets to the specific trauma-saturated context of most conflict mediation. In mediation, the
third might have figurative and literal meanings, as the (figurative) intersubjective field that is
more than the sum of the two actors who co-constitute it, and the (literal) figure of the mediator
who introduces a third figure and creates a dynamic of triangulation.
Benjamin distinguishes this form of relationship from the complementary relationship in
which the subject-object principle prevails: one acts, the other is its object, that is, both partners
are located in the “orbit of the other’s escalating reactivity.” 40 I argue that fostering a
triangulated relationship like this is key to the creation of a safe space. I am referring to the
potential for the mediation process to act as a safe space psychically insofar as the mediation
process can become a setting for stepping out of the cyclical and escalating reactivity, to enable
fresh thinking, a different emotional experience, and, crucially, a new relationship with the
other.
Highlighting the similarities between the role of the analyst and the role of the mediator,
Benjamin argues that the ability of analysts to co-create a “third” relies on their accepting the
necessity “of becoming involved in a process that is often outside our control and
understanding.” 41 In our preliminary interviews with mediators, this lack of control was
identified as one of the key pressures on mediators. For Benjamin, effective therapeutic action
rests on specific values— humility, compassion, and tolerance for one’s own uncertainty. In
the conflict arena, she seems to imply that mediators, the ones who are nominally meant to be
in control of the process, for the benefit of all parties, must accept that to a significant degree
they are not in control—however much preparation is done and however effective they deem
themselves to be. Mediators need support and, potentially, training in tolerating and learning
to manage uncertainty, for the health of the process and their own mental health.
Additionally, mutual recognition is also not some once-and-for-all acquired capacity or
achievement but an intersubjectively brokered dynamic process that needs to be returned to
over and over again. Mediation’s potential to be transformative lies in the quality of
intersubjectivity predicated here as a mode of being, perceiving, and feeling that is likely to be
experienced for the first time by the parties in conflict. The function of the mediator is key in
9
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establishing and embodying this modality; mediators will need to embody this principle and
act on it before the parties can adopt it themselves. This dynamic is captured by Benjamin’s
concept of a “moral third” and its role in offering a place to look away from the other in order
to find a means of living with that other.
As a consequence, the “moral third” is predicated on the ability of the individual to
identify, focus on, and invest in something other than the lost object. It draws the protagonists’
gaze by its empathic participation, which in turn makes it possible for these protagonists to
move into a triangulated space. That is, the third’s involvement in the triangular scenario allows
the other participants to turn away from the intense presence of one another, giving each of
them space to breathe.
We will see an applied illustration of this process in a later discussion of the empathic
mutual positioning model. Translated back into the terms being deployed here, the turningtoward-reality of the witness/mediator is necessary to allow a space for retreat from the violent
abjection of otherness that feels necessary when one is too close, when the only way of dealing
with the “occupying” presence of the other in the space that one wants to claim as one’ s own
is to destroy that other.
Bader sees the significance of the intersubjective perspective in how it emphasizes the
importance of understanding the self not in isolation but within the context of human
interaction. 42 As a result, it yields interesting insights about conflict and its resolution. For
example, intersubjective theorists point out that during a therapeutic impasse the therapist may
be required or may wish to make a frank admission to the client of the therapist’s inability to
resolve the impasse for the client. This confession of powerlessness helpfully returns the
responsibility to the client to decide whether to commit to moving forward with the process. A
similar principle is applicable to impasse in mediation and resonates with comments made by
mediators. Often an admission of powerlessness is exactly what is needed to move to
resolution.43
“Safe spaces” within mediation, as advocated by Rifkind and Yawanarajah, and mediation
processes as safe space, as argued here, play a crucial role in facilitating the creation of “the
third,” by enabling conflict parties to explore their feelings, internal narratives, and personal
motives. These ideas resonate with a recent article in the Economist that argues that the
increasing prominence and popularity of track 2 mediation in part reflects the desire by parties
in mediation for “safe spaces” that provide deniability from engaging with mediation in the
first place—it is off the record, which is a significant advantage over official track 1
mediation.44 I suggest that turning mediation processes into safe spaces requires the mediator
to actively and continuously establish the safety for both parties by manifesting neutrality and
a lack of judgment and employing active listening, paraphrasing, and ongoing
acknowledgment. Mediators already practice some of these clinically derived techniques
intuitively, but systematic research and empirically based knowledge are needed to understand
better what psychological mechanisms contribute to making mediation spaces safe. The safety
of the mediation space can also help establish and maintain consent from the parties involved.
In addition to positioning the mediator as the “moral third,” we can begin to see the
importance of the mediator’s capacity to be mindful of and to navigate the troubled waters of
minds at war with themselves and with others in the intersubjective field. I suggest that
mediators be trained, and supported in their efforts, to develop sensitivity to sudden shifts in
the affective register in the room and approach them not as obstacles but as vital information
about the parties’ inner struggles. The role of the moral third is to withstand the ambivalence—
the need for and simultaneous resistance to a new encounter—to foster the encounter as a safe
space, and to reflect back the hope for, if not the possibility of, a different way of being and
coexisting with others.
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The Minds of Parties in Conflict
Understanding Trauma
Elsewhere in this issue, Eugen Koh presents a comprehensive discussion of the psychology
and psychodynamics of trauma. Here, I briefly consider the impact of a traumatized mind on
the relational field.
Trauma is the noun of the Greek verb titrosko: to pierce, to wound. Literally, trauma is
the mark left by a piercing, but the term has evolved from having an exclusively medical
connotation to being synonymous with any form of wound. In psychological language, trauma
refers to the metaphorical piercing of the psychological protective membrane of a person. 45
Severe trauma leaves the mind in a state of great vulnerability even though the psychological
wounds leave no physical mark.
Scholars widely agree that psychological trauma has a marked effect on the mind’s relation
to time.46 Trauma interferes with the ordinary temporal functioning of the mind, and when the
traumatic event is reactivated, for the traumatized subject, the past breaks through the present
as if it had just happened. Thus, Koh defines trauma as a “crisis of temporality” and a
“distortion of time.” In other words, trauma is “a system’s experience of being incapable of
processing or making sense.”47 Flashbacks, a key symptom in post-traumatic stress disorder,
are understood psychodynamically as a repeated attempt to revisit an event to try to make sense
of an experience so profoundly upsetting that the mind cannot “digest.”
To deal with the powerful impingement of trauma, the mind reverts to primitive modes of
functioning that are intolerant of ambiguity and ambivalence. The capacity for symbolic
thinking is often lost following trauma and replaced by concrete and polarized thinking; the
world becomes split into good and bad, populated by friends and enemies, with none of the
mental flexibility needed for complexity.
The polarized and starkly divided world that is inhabited by the traumatized mind feeds
distrust and suspicion, and with the added loss of capacity for emotional regulation,
traumatized individuals tend to be in a state of hyper alert and anxiety. This is likely to be the
affective state of mind of parties participating in mediation processes. To protect their
vulnerability, they are likely to want to hide their fragile, vulnerable, and volatile state of mind
through posturing and overcompensating with shows of strength and aggression. Attending
only to the manifest behavior runs the risk of missing out on what often drives and underpins
it. The important point here that the mediator needs to be mindful of and differentiate between
the manifest content and the function of the parties’ behavior. The mediator would need to be
aware of the anger and hatred resulting from each party’s facing their enemy and the role of
hostility and rage in psychically holding each party together. Put differently, resistance and
intransigence might not simply be manifestations of stubbornness and hatred, they might also
signal the operation of rigid defense mechanisms employed to protect deep psychological
fragility, vulnerability, and anxiety. Resistance can have a stabilizing function for a traumatized
mind.
Thus, resistance should be recognized and addressed first to enable the parties to move to
more sophisticated mental functioning. This is part of what some mediators refer to as getting
the parties to a state of “preparedness” for negotiations.48 Readiness for mediation is a long,
difficult, and multi-layered process. Here I am referring to the complex psychological shift in
the minds of the parties necessary for a successful mediation and lasting agreements.
It is important to remember that trauma heightens and distorts the perception of risk and
danger, engenders reactive responses such as fight or flight, and plunges the person to the
affective state of intense fear and anxiety. Thinking becomes very difficult and symbolic
capacities, which require distance from terror, are lost when trauma brings the threat so close
that only fight or flight responses are possible. In prolonged conflict, new trauma brings back
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and piles on the previous trauma, building a mounting storage of unprocessed affective contents
that eventually becomes normalized. This is the most dangerous state of mind and the least
conducive to mediation because it becomes increasingly harder to remember that there is a
different way to live.
In this context, the mediation process and the mediator can function as a “container.” The
psychodynamic concept of container was applied most potently by Bion in his work with
traumatized war veterans and was based on the observation of the psychological work of the
primary caretaker with a small infant who is in the grips of overwhelming anxiety. 49 The
container takes in the experience, digests it, and gives it back to the infant in a form that is
manageable. The process helps infants, and traumatized individuals, to deal with overwhelming
emotions slowly through thinking and symbolic processing. The container must be safe, thus
reiterating the key role of the mediator in making the process safe. To some extent, breaking
down processes into manageable parts is reflected in how agreements and transitional
arrangements are often broken down into manageable elements.
Additionally, recognizing these primitive states of mind and acknowledging how they
might be hidden under the surface can give some insight into the sudden and ostensibly
irrational blockages and resistance in the process.
Understanding Resistance in the Mediation Process
Benjamin notes that while resolution of conflict is supposedly desired, it is also deeply feared
because of the vulnerability that it brings to the fore and the intimate dependency on the other
that it requires to make it work, and because of what might have to be given up if it were to
succeed.50 Thus, there is a great deal of ambivalence, not least tied to what is to be given up by
coming out of conflict—the subject’s investment in their conflicted state of being, in their
enemy, in their own righteousness are all experienced as profound losses, even if none of them
works in the subject’s “best interests.” 51 Conversely, violence is intensely invested in as a
symbolic as well as a material structure of “security”; yet it is precisely in the manufacture of
violence that security is undermined, both politically and psychologically, and suffering and
vulnerability are made most apparent. We cannot think, it seems, about the damage that this
position produces (the mind at war with itself); and this failure to think blocks the path to our
freedom.
In this section I discuss two psychological dynamics that often underpin resistance in
mediation. I use Volkan’s concept of “chosen traumas” as a group dynamic and the ego-threats
from shame, humiliation, and loss of face to illustrate how a psychodynamic framing of the
mediation process as an intersubjective encounter enables insights into blockages and
resistance.
Volkan’s work on group psychology offers a compelling articulation of the fluid
relationship between individual and group identity, of the dynamic interaction between the
interior psychic life of the individual and the sociohistoric context in which the individual
developed, and how they are indivisible in their mutual co-formation. Volkan refers to the
“chosen trauma” as the shared mental representation of a massive trauma that a large group’s
ancestors suffered at the hand of an enemy. 52 The chosen trauma can be reactivated to support
the large group’s threatened identity, which ordinarily refers to religion, nationality, or
ethnicity.
Volkan is interested in how, when members of a large group experience the threat of
losing an idealized leader who is imagined to be able to repair all narcissistic damages, they
might become violent in an attempt to destroy external reality that is perceived as interfering
with this shared illusion. 53 In such a situation, Volkan observed that the emerging personal
stories tended to reflect what “others did to us” and additional aspects of large-group conflict
and large-group identity difficulties. Individual identity and large-group identity both provide
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security and protection, and the individual hardly notices either one under normal
circumstances. But during times of collective stress, such as economic crisis, drastic political
change, social upheaval, or war, the large-group identity “takes on greater importance, and
individuals may collectively seek the protection of, and also help defend, their large-group
tent.”54
The important point for us is the fluidity of the self in moving between different kinds of
identity, in this instance, individual and large-group identity, depending on circumstances and
level of threat. The fluidity between group and individual identity goes beyond the shifts in
self-positioning and is relevant to mediation in terms of transgenerational transmissions of
trauma. Ample clinical evidence exists of the fluidity between mother’s and child’s psychic
borders and that the mother’s anxieties and her perceptions and expectations of the external
world can pass into the child’s developing sense of self. For example, it is now widely accepted
that traumatic experiences during the Holocaust were passed down to Jewish children. 55
According to Volkan, “such traumatic events affect all those under the ethnic or national tent,
and often initiate unconscious societal or political processes.”56 Virtually every large group has
suffered loss and experienced shame and humiliation in a conflict with another large group,
which have formed a shared mental representation of the event. If the large group has not
managed to acknowledge and mourn these losses and humiliations, its mental representation
will be passed down the generations and injured self-images are “deposited” into the
developing self-representation of children in the next generation. Volkan calls such historical
events, passed down over generations, “chosen traumas.”
Crucially, with time, the function of the chosen trauma changes. The historical truth about
the event is no longer important for the large group, while the function of the chosen trauma
becomes to link together members of the group. Thus, the chosen trauma becomes a key
component in individuals’ identity that also binds them to their group. This characteristic of
group and individual identity is not always visible or active. It can lie dormant for a long time
but also suddenly be reactivated and exert a powerful psychological force. Throughout history,
leaders have reactivated a chosen trauma for their strategic purposes, for example, Serbs’
chosen trauma concerning the mental representation of the battle of Kosovo that played a major
role in the atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
For our purposes, we need to consider that chosen traumas are likely to form the
psychological backlog of mediation, and, when those traumas are reactivated in the mediation
process, the individuals involved might appear to shift, suddenly and unpredictably, between
their present identity committed to the mediation to that of the injured large-group identity
seeking revenge for their past suffering.
Here lies the potential of a psychosocial approach for mediation in the ability to appreciate
that individual identity is never separate from social identity, and social identity is always
charged with powerful affects infused with the emotional remnants of individual histories.
Such an approach bypasses the society-individual binary, enabling a deeper understanding of
the complexity of human subjectivity and the psychological shifts and turns in the mediation
process.
Conflict produces what social psychologists call “ego‐threats,” which greatly complicate
conflict resolution. 57 When a party’s pride is wounded during negotiation, even acceptable
offers may be rejected out of spite. 58 In the psychoanalytic literature, ego-threats may be
referred to as “narcissistic issues,” 59 while in the conflict resolution literature, there is a
tendency to speak of them as a party’s need to “save face” or of a person’s “ego” or
“egocentric” perspective clouding his thinking. 60 Loss of face, humiliation, and shame and its
counterpart, pride, are intimately linked to these “ego threats” and “narcissistic wounds,” and
they can play a key role in blocking conciliation and peace. A brief exploration of
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psychoanalytic and developmental psychology research on shame can explain why and how
this happens.
Because of the perpetration of violence and human rights violations that often precede
mediation and because guilt is connected to culpability and blame, it is a more visible emotion
than shame. The effects of shame, however, the “Cinderella of the unpleasant emotions,”61 as
Helen Block Lewis points out, can be far more damaging than the effects of guilt, because shame
involves a whole-pervasive negative evaluation of the self.62
Thus, the experience of guilt has a much more contained impact on individuals because it
is restricted to what they have done not who they are. Conversely, shame is felt as a pervasive
and global experience whereby the whole self is perceived as inferior, humiliated, and lacking.
Emotionally and metaphorically, shame does not leave the individual any place to hide.
Among what Lewis refers to as the “shame family of emotions,” the most relevant to
mediation processes are those feelings that involve the self in a loss of dignity and status.
Shame appears earlier than guilt, in Erik Erikson’s second phase of human development, in
which the muscular maturation in the child enables him or her to experiment with two
simultaneous sets of social modalities: holding back and letting go. 63 Though holding back
might not be helpful, it allows the individual a sense of control and mastery, while letting go
often is associated with exposure, inadequacy, and deep shame. In conflict and peace
negotiation, people fiercely defend against such exposure, particularly when they feel
threatened and they want to appear strong.
If, as Benjamin argues, parties in conflict need to “let go” in order to repair, understanding
shame gives us insight into why such a letting go is often deeply resisted. Shame as a social
feeling64 is so feared that it becomes a means of social control and, with pride, serves as intense
and automatic bodily signs of the state of one’s bond to others. Pride is the sign of an intact bond;
shame, of a severed or threatened one. Because they are powerful embodied experiences, the
instinctive bodily manifestations of shame and pride make the two emotions easy to identify—
holding one’s head high in pride, lowering one’s eyes in shame—thus signaling to the mediator
the experienced vulnerability of the parties. If not sensitively attended to, shame can be followed
by resistance and a defensive hardening of positions.
Shame is one of the twelve “innate affects” that, according to Tomkins, are the primary
biological motivating mechanisms, more urgent than drive deprivation, pleasure, or physical pain,
and are universal and in operation from birth.65 Shame/humiliation is one of the negative innate
affects and is accompanied by specific bodily manifestations—lowered eyes, lowered head,
possibly with the face covered—that make shame and humiliation recognizable across cultures.
Related to shame and humiliation is Sandler and colleagues’ formulation of the “ideal shape
of the self.”66 When we embody the self we wish to be or ought to be, we feel pride. But when
our actual self is found lacking in comparison to our ideal self, we experience shame, feelings of
inferiority, and decreased self-esteem.67 The presence of an audience is critical in this experience
because of the centrality of the self-other interaction, the effect on the self of seeing oneself “in
the eyes of the other.”68 The consequent impulse to hide, to protect one’s vulnerability, makes
shame difficult to handle.
Through the finding of mirror neurons, we now know that our selves are fundamentally
social selves, wired for human interconnection from the earliest days, 69 and that we are subtly
reconfiguring each other on a neurological level as we communicate. 70 Neurological mirroring
in conditions of shame and humiliation becomes excruciating and can threaten the mediation.
In the field of mediation, “face issues” have been considered so important that, because they
generally are hidden under the surface, the experience has been likened to doing mediation in a
minefield.71
Eriksson interviewed mediators in Ethiopia to investigate psychological factors in mediation
processes.72 The mediators she interviewed identified self-esteem, the ability to let go, losing
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face, and mirroring as psychological factors of great importance in mediation. Self-esteem and
the threat to it and pride through losing face seemed to play the most important roles. Eriksson
links self-esteem, shame, and pride to reflective functioning 73 and mutual recognition in the
intersubjective encounter. 74 Losing face is an ego-threat, because it is accompanied by
humiliation, shame, and loss of self-esteem, and a threat to the social bond. Losing face in relation
to the group one represents implies potential humiliation and loss of status and respect but can
result in material losses, too, such as loss of a position or a job. Thus, individually and
interpersonally, fear of losing face could reorient negotiating parties away from cooperation and
toward renewed competition and entrenchment.75
Psychology offers mediators new means of understanding what might be perceived as
stubborn, destructive, or “irrational” behavior by the parties in conflict. In this framing,
resistance stems from an unwillingness or inability to grieve and let go of traumas and related
experiences of the other that have configured the self to such an extent that their loss feels like
a threat to one’s identity. As such, resistance stems from the anxiety evoked by a perceived
threat to the very foundations of the self. Frosh captures this key dynamic:
To become emancipatory, resistance has to involve an opening as well as a refusal. The
refusal is of the structures of power as they are naturalized in their self-presentation (“it
has to be like this; you are called on to assent and comply”); the opening is the turn
towards the reality of the other and of the situation, however alarming and threatening
it may be.76
The outside figure or “third party” is enabling in preventing the subject from being
engulfed by the lost object. However potentially liberating, the encounter of parties in conflict
with the “moral third” is extremely fragile. In psychoanalysis, the intersubjective field has been
described as oscillating between mobilization and stagnation, integration and splitting.77
I expect this back-and-forth movement between progress and regression or simply
“stuckness” is familiar to mediators and cannot be negated or bypassed. Instead, I suggest that
its acceptance as an integral part of the mediation process might offer mediators a different
understanding of what could otherwise be experienced as “going backwards.”

The Mind of the Mediator and Its Functions
Despite the historic neglect of emotions and of psychology in general in the field of mediation,
interest in the subject is growing. This interest, however, applies primarily to the parties in
conflict, while little consideration seems to have been given to the mind of the mediator or the
impact of mediation on the mediator. 78 Bader, a mediator herself, appears to be the exception,
though her focus is not peace mediation. Nevertheless, her reflections are worth considering. 79
According to Bader, the mediators’ ability to deal with issues of self and identity is a key
ingredient of a successful mediation, and a psychoanalytic understanding can help mediators
move through these issues in a way that social psychology cannot, by enabling mediators to
reflect and work through their own contributions to the parties’ dynamic and the process of
resolution on a deeper level. 80 For example, self‐observation may reveal that the process
evokes and reactivates the mediator’s own patterns of relating to key figures in their past—
parents, siblings, and so on. There are countless possible permutations, and projections travel
in both directions, with other actors in the process also having emotional responses to the
mediator. The crucial point is that understanding these projections and their seductiveness will
help mediators unpack their own reactions and return to neutrality when parties become
difficult or challenging. Bader compellingly concludes, “In many ways, this commitment to
inner neutrality is an essential prerequisite to a truly well-functioning outward neutrality.”81
She reflects that, psychologically, the process of mediation demands strength of self on
a basic, simple, healthy level, especially at the outset. During impasse and other “critical
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moments,” if the parties wish to reach resolution, they may have to release their psychological
investments in the outcome of the negotiation. Thus, as Benjamin also argues, the capacity to
let go is a critical aspect of the psychology of mediation. But, Bader points out, the mediator’s
own issues of self and identity will also arise during mediation. 82 During critical moments, the
mediator, too, may have to release the sense of narcissistic self‐investment in the outcome.
This point was expressed in our preliminary interviews with mediators as “knowing when to
walk away” and resist the urge to agree to a patently unsustainable peace or negotiate beyond
one’s remit. Hence, Bader argues, mediators’ usefulness will often depend on the extent to
which they have learned to deal with issues of self and identity in themselves as well as in
others. Drawing on the psychoanalytic literature on group therapy leadership, Bader considers
the “grandiose professional ego ideal” to be one of the key narcissistic dangers for the group
leader.83 This grandiose self may desire to be seen as a “selfless helper,”84 and it may wish to
be all powerful, all knowing, and all loving as a defense to vulnerability.85
It would be interesting to research what motivates mediators to embark on the ostensibly
thankless, Sisyphean task of reconciling parties that want to kill each other. Are they motivated
by an unconscious wish to repair something damaged in their own lives? Are they driven by a
“savior complex”? Are they harboring unconscious heroic fantasies or are they driven by a
deep wish to help and make a difference? In short, are mediators aware of what is driving them
and how their “story” has brought them to mediation? This need for mediator reflexivity was
raised repeatedly in our interviews. Though much could be learned from studying mediators’
psychology and though mediators do play a crucial role in the process, peace mediation is not
about the mediator as an individual but about the mediator’s enabling function in the mediation
process. Thus, my approach to the states of mind of the mediator takes a different direction and
develops along three strands.
The first strand looks at how the mediator’s state of mind can be used to gauge the
affective register of the relational field at any given time and gain insights into the state of mind
of the participants. Here the metaphor of the mediator as an “affective sponge” refers to the
mediator’s functioning as an “affective barometer.” Were mediators intuitively, or following
training, able to reflect on their own state of mind, the resulting “attunement” could be a
powerful tool in the mediation encounter.
The second strand looks at the facilitative role of the mediator in embodying and
performing positions alternative to the rigid and antagonistic state of mind of the parties, and,
in doing so, offering them a new experience and new ways of relating to the other. This is what
was referred to earlier as the mediator’s acting as the “moral third.” Here, the mediator’s mind
is intersubjectively facilitating the process by holding, processing, and reformulating painful
contents and experiences and modeling alternative positions to bolster the mediation process.
In this function, clinical tools and techniques as well as an ethical stance of nonjudgment
(however difficult that is likely to be) could be particularly effective.
The third strand returns to the mediator as an individual and centers on the damaging
impact of the mediation on the mediator. Here the metaphor of mediator as an “emotions
sponge” is used to acknowledge the toxic effect on the mediator of prolonged exposure to rage,
angst, anxiety, deep hurt, hostility, aggression, disassociation, and near psychotic states of
mind. Put simply, the mediator is likely to absorb a large amount of the emotional disturbance
activated around the negotiation table. While I have argued for the creative potential of
mediators emotionally tuning into the parties’ states of mind, it is also urgent to ask, What
impact does absorbing all this emotional disturbance have on the mediator’s well-being and,
consequently, the process of mediation? Our interviews with mediators and mediation support
teams has made clear that the psychological attunement described earlier is, to some extent,
already intuitively and instinctively practiced. But there seems to be an essentialist reading of
these skills as “natural” capacities that make some mediators better at being emotionally
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attuned and emotionally intelligent than others because of their intrinsic qualities, life
experiences, and personality traits. If this deterministic view is accurate, then mediation is
dependent on few “gifted” individuals. Besides my own skepticism about stable personality
traits, and because of basis of my experience as a clinical practitioner, trainer, and supervisor,
I believe these skills can be taught and learned.
Mediator’s Mind as Affective Barometer
The understanding of the mediator’s mind as an instrument to decode the affective register of
the mediation process hinges on the mediators’ capacity to reflect on their own states of mind
and contextual emotional “disturbance” not as a hindrance to the process or as simply an
uncomfortable or unwelcome experience but as information.
Psychoanalysis has coined two highly relevant concepts to capture the patient’s
emotionally intense attachment to their analyst: transference and countertransference —the
nonverbal communication of the patient’s unprocessed and therefore unconscious psychic
contents to the analyst. Transference, strictly speaking, refers to the transfer of feelings from a
key relationship in childhood onto the therapist, but, in a looser sense, transference is a common
dynamic in everyday life that has inspired such expressions as “a father figure.” Listening to
Betty Bigombe talk about her experience negotiating with Joseph Kony, the leader of the
Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda, I was struck to hear Kony call her Mama. This
maternal transference enabled her to access a male-dominated setting in which it was culturally
insulting and demeaning to be negotiating with a woman. I suspect that transference is very
present in mediation and that it could be intuitively or more strategically recognized and used
toward the establishment or strengthening of connections in the relational field.
Countertransference is more complicated and trickier to recognize but invaluable in other
ways. Countertransference loosely refers to the analyst’s emotional entanglement with the
patient and is broadly understood as the therapist’s emotional-cognitive and behavioral
responses to clients in therapy or at least those responses that are potentially problematic. 86
Freud and most psychoanalysts considered countertransference an interference and a sign of
the analyst’s needing more analysis, until Paula Heimann’s seminal paper, in which she
proposes that, provided the analyst is able to recognize and differentiate his or her own
emotional reactions from the patient’s, countertransference should be considered an
unconscious communication of unprocessed and therefore unknown contents of the patient’s
mind that could not be communicated otherwise.87 The relevance of this proposal for mediation
is far-reaching because it could give a skilled mediator vital information about what the parties
are experiencing, thus signaling sensitive topics, eruptions of irrationality, and so on. It could
also help mediators identify personal resonance between what is happening around the
negotiating table and their personal life, thus helping them to regain neutrality, control, and a
deeper understanding of the interaction. I would argue that this kind of deep attunement is
inescapable in intense and prolonged interactions, particularly when they are highly
emotionally charged. Rather than attempting to suppress the affective charge and sanitize the
process of emotions, a reframing of the mediator’s countertransference would translate into
being able to “take the pulse” of the interaction, and the mediator’s mind could act as a decoder.
For example, attunement would prevent the mediator from being taken aback by an unexpected
expression of resistance and destructiveness.
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Mediator’s Facilitative Functions: Mirroring and Modeling
In this discussion of the key role the mediator could play in the intersubjective field in mirroring
and modeling new relational functions for the participants, I concentrate on the empathic
mutual positioning model,88 its role in holding and containing fraught stages in the mediation
process, and how its internalization can pave the way to new forms of intersubjective
interaction.
The model of empathic mutual positioning refers to the “expansive,” “embracing,” and
“reflexive” functions. It is a key, distinctive, and essential component in reconciliation
processes and is related to the positioning-interests-needs model (see Figure 1) widely used in
mediated practical work in conflict resolution/transformation. As an intentional commitment
to conciliation, it operates as a force, but it is also a dynamic psychic process in that, while it
is unfolding, it changes the people involved. The application of empathic mutual positioning
as a strategic approach to conciliation by mediators engaged in reconciliation practice has
potential benefits. Mediators can encourage, support, or exploit empathic mutual positioning
to scaffold the process and support participants at difficult points in the conciliation.
Through the expansive function of empathic mutual positioning, participants allow
expanded positions for themselves and the other. This function counteracts the potential reentrenchment into old and oppositional positions and returns humanity to the individuals
involved in the conciliation process by allowing them complexity. It enables a shift from the
polarized, rigid position of being either the perpetrator or the victim to being both, in addition
to other aspects of identity as a human being—a parent, a sibling, a neighbor, a faith
practitioner, a child, a son or daughter, a cousin, a friend, and so on—which introduce a
recognition of commonality erased by conflict.
The embracing function of empathic mutual positioning fosters acceptance of difference
in many manifestations but primarily in terms of the different needs—within the same person
and between the actors involved in the process. This idea hinges on a view of human beings as
conflicted, as psychological (e.g., conscious and unconscious parts of their minds wanting
different things) and as social and relational subjects. Through the embracing function of
empathic mutual positioning, a person’s needs can be preserved as asymmetric, thus enabling
mutual recognition and respect.
The reflexive function of empathic mutual positioning refers to participants’ awareness
and mindfulness of how the other is or might be affected by one’s own words and actions. This
crucial function allows participants to tell their own story while mitigating its impact.
The cumulative effect of these three functions is to scaffold the process of reconciliation,
enable gestures of empathy, 89 and facilitate conflict transformation. Additionally, empathic
mutual positioning is not simply facilitative; it is crucially formative in the dialogical process
of identity formation, which is, by nature, always relational.
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Figure 1. Iceberg representation of PIN model of conflict resolution
Source: Simon Fisher et al., Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action (London:
Zed Books, 2007).
Toxic Mediation
In a consideration of the emotional impact of mediation on the mediator, the American
Counseling Association concept of “emotional residue of exposure” in secondary trauma is
consistent with the metaphor I propose in this article of the mediator as an “affective sponge.”
Connected to this are ideas of secondary trauma and secondary exposure to trauma. According
to the literature, those affected by secondary trauma cover a wide span that includes teachers,
mental health and health workers, those working in child protection, NGO personnel on the
ground, and journalists. The absence of mediators in this list is striking and, in my view, in
need of urgent consideration. “Secondary trauma refers to the impact of indirect exposure to
traumatic experiences; effects which can be ‘disruptive and painful’ and can ‘persist for months
or years.”90
More specifically and fitting to mediators’ experience: “Secondary exposure to
trauma refers to the widespread phenomenon of indirect exposure to different types of
traumatic material, such as contacts with people who have experienced traumatic events,
exposure to graphic trauma content (e.g., reported by the survivor), exposure to people’s
cruelty to one another, and observation of and participation in traumatic re-enactments.”91 The
authors of this description note that secondary exposure to trauma has been linked to “higher
levels of distress,” and “secondary traumatic stress.” The secondary trauma concept is often
used interchangeably with related (similarly ill-defined) concepts such as “burn
out,” “compassion fatigue” (a highly disputed and confusing term), and “vicarious trauma.”
In addition to these secondary factors, and unlike other professionals dealing with trauma,
the mediator is also affected by a crisscrossing of further stressors: pressures from their
superiors or those the mediator is accountable to, from donors, and from the mediation parties
themselves, and attacks from or active resistance by spoilers. Furthermore, all mediators I
interviewed reported difficult working conditions: punishing schedules, sleep deprivation, little
downtime, tensions within teams, and unrealistic or impossible deadlines. With no specialist
support and no opportunity for debriefing, many resort to excessive use of alcohol or
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prescription drugs to deal with the unrelenting pace and to get some respite while recognizing
the deep and often lasting damage to their mental health and private lives. Some openly stated
and others implied that they felt alone and unsupported.
It is intriguing and worrying, therefore, that the mediator’s well-being is not discussed
widely and urgently. But taking into account the resistance in IR and in mediation studies to
engaging with emotions beyond considering them a nuisance, the clear denial and disregard of
the mediator’s emotional well-being is not surprising. What beliefs and narratives about the
figure of the mediator sustain such neglect of mediators’ welfare? We must consider ways to
support mediators emotionally so they can operate effectively without paying a high personal
cost.

From Theory to the Applied: Recommendations for Practice and Further
Training
In summary, psychosocial psychology can help peace mediation in three ways:92
1. By increasing mediator’s psychological knowledge and understanding of the process
2. By enhancing and expanding mediators’ psychological skills
3. By providing psychological support for the mediator and the mediation process
The proposed framing of the mediation process as an intersubjective relational encounter
is not meant to replace or reduce the importance of existing strategic and goal-oriented
approaches. Instead, the reframing is intended to facilitate the attainment of the set goals by
enriching the understanding and appreciation of the parties as complex, psychosocially
conflicted, and traumatized individuals. Such a complex understanding could help in managing
blockages and impasses, while optimizing the potential for the process to foster more
sustainable agreements and peace.
A psychosocial understanding and psychological tools can assist mediation processes by
getting people “unstuck.” Mediators appreciate that in any form of conflict people become
entrenched in repetition, which needs to be disrupted not just because conflict is historical and
longstanding but also because a rigid and polarized mindset often results from trauma and
repetition. A psychosocial approach can help to understand repetition and its relationship with
patterns of attachment and safety, internally and socially. The role of the unconscious is key,
and all mediation actors should be aware that not everything is spelled out and not everything
has to be pinned down. All mediation actors also should have the capacity to reflect on what
they bring to the process that is emotional and personal.
Temporality is another significant dimension. Though it cannot properly be discussed in
this article, it needs to be flagged at this point. What has been offered is a general framing that
will acquire different meaning and significance at different points of the mediation process.
Data suggest that the more loosely constructed track 2 and 3 processes might be more
conducive to the application of the intersubjective framing proposed here than the more
formalized track 1 mediation. More creativity may be required in incorporating such framing
into the more structured track 1 processes, but this does not make the framing less relevant. On
the contrary, it could be argued that because parties are likely to feel there is so much more at
stake when they reach track 1, the psychosocial pressures also increase. Because politically
imposed timelines can prevent success, it is important to distinguish between general and
specific timelines to achieve different goals. Thus, the reframing proposed here cannot be
prescriptive or formulaic. It needs to be nimble, flexible, and adapted to dovetail with the
structure of the process and its psychosocial context.
Timing matters also because all discussions and interactions have a certain rhythm.
Psychologists could assist in targeting interventions by listening and understanding the
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choreography of a discussion. For example, there is a moment when a discussion passes a
threshold after which there is no going back. A mediator could identify this “tipping point”
more easily with psychological support or advice. There is also the level of “preparedness” for
mediation that, I suggest, should go beyond working with constituencies and beyond working
on the specificity of claims and positions and that requires also working with the psychology
of the parties involved.
Trying to understand people’s identities is an important part of working with the
psychology of the parties involved in mediation. What are they “invested in” and what is their
“bigger system”? What puts pressure on this system? The success of mediation processes lies
in how well the individual can be “moved,” how the mind-set of an individual or a group can
be changed. Psychologists and psychotherapists can assist in finding points of commonality
and provide a different perspective on perceptions of reality but also support individuals in
managing the painful and arduous transition from patterns of understanding and relating that
they know and are attached to, to a mental state in which they can encounter a rehumanized
opponent.
To achieve this goal, it is necessary to enhance and expand mediators’ intuitive and
practice-based knowledge through the following psychosocial skills and tools:
1. Increasing mediators’ psychosocial knowledge and understanding of the process.
Training is needed to integrate the psychosocial tools—that is, a culturally sensitive,
historically contextualized, psychologically complexified take on the parties in conflict,
as well as the mediator’s enhanced capacity for self-reflection and awareness of
personal investment—into existing mediation tools. Training is needed also to increase
sensitivity to the psychology of “meaning making” and meaningfulness to inform the
mediator about what is psychologically non-negotiable and essential for the parties
involved. A focus on language, narratives, and metaphors and their emotional and
psychological significance would be beneficial. The orientation proposed here would
provide mediators with a better understanding of the “irrational” and unconscious mind
as defended, conflicted, and, often, damaged by trauma and history. 93 An understanding
of parties’ resistance as self-protection, rather than pure obstructiveness, would
enhance the mediator’s ability to deal with blockages and otherwise inexplicable
setbacks.94
2. Enhancing and expanding mediators’ psychological skills. These skills include the
capacity to use oneself as a psychological instrument in the mediation process, rather
than only a broker. Coaching, training, and supervision are needed to develop and
sustain emotional intelligence in mediators in a way that equips them to understand and
manage better their own emotional states in the service of the process. Training would
involve the integration of techniques originating from the clinic—such as active
listening, paraphrasing, suspending judgment, holding and emotional containment, as
well as modeling and practicing empathic mutual positioning—alongside existing
mediation tools. Many of these skills are already intuitively practiced, particularly in
tracks 2 and 3, but they need to be systematized and linked to a deeper psychosocial
understanding of the parties.
3.

Providing psychological support for the mediator and the mediation process. This
recommendation is based on the understanding that, regardless of their level of
experience and seniority, mediators are vulnerable to the corrosive and damaging
impact of being immersed for protracted periods in conflictual situations. Thus, the aim
of this use of psychological tools is to create psychological support for mediators.
Creating this support might require training in resilience and self-care—that is, training
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to develop psychological techniques to manage the multifaceted psychological aspects
of their job. These would range from stress management techniques to techniques to
manage the multisourced power dynamics involved in the constellation of
constituencies to which the mediator needs to account. Additionally, mediators’
comments in interviews suggest that mediators would benefit from being able to access
regular psychological debriefing and a support system that would accompany the
mediator and the mediation support teams. The suggested psychological support could
take the form of one-on-one sessions with a clinician or with a “reflective partner” with
whom to discuss confidentially psychological aspects of the mediation process outside
the mediation process.
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